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Report of Meeting Held in State Department
Friday, November 29, from 3:30 to 5:15 PM

Attended by: Secretaries Dulles and McElroy, Mr. Killian, General Twining, Mr. Brundage, Deputy Secretary Quarles, Ambassador Burgess, Gov. Stevenson and others, including Reinhardt, Irwin, Berding, Smith and Foster

The meeting was called by Secretary Dulles to consider and approve 10 draft telegrams which had been circulated by State to the participants that morning. Upon approval, the telegrams are to be sent to Ambassador Burgess, who will have returned to Paris in order to present the U.S. position to the NATO Council at its Monday meeting.

Telegram 1 consists of instructions to Ambassador Burgess which state that the following telegrams contain the substance of certain U.S. views and proposals for the December NATO meeting. The telegram concluded that the proposals represented "current thinking" of the U.S. Government and did not encompass all points that will be touched on in the U.S. statement at the December meeting.

Telegram 2 deals with the NATO Atomic Stockpile. Secretary Dulles stated that this telegram had been cleared in substance with the Joint Chiefs.

Quarles introduced a paper containing substantive revisions in the second page of this telegram. In an aside to Secretary Dulles, he indicated that Defense and State would have to work out the "matter that Cutler was worrying about in connection with U.S. instructions to SACEUR." He added "we are in trouble on this situation". As far as the NATO paper was concerned, his revised draft of the last paragraph on page 2 made it clear that authorization for the use of atomic warheads in the event of hostilities would come from the President.

Telegram 3 referred to the deployment and production of IRBMs in the NATO area. Quarles said Defense had no idea as to the number of squadrons to be deployed to Europe. He made clear that the squadrons so deployed would be made available by the U.S. either as grant aid or sales under terms to be worked out. He pointed out that the further development and production of IRBMs to be undertaken in Europe meant the "follow on" of the present weapon. He said General Norstad apparently hoped to be able to produce the present version of our IRBMs in Europe, but Defense doubted this would be practical.

At the suggestion of Secretary Dulles, the text was changed from "will be ready to deliver these squadrons", to "expects".

Telegram 4 dealt with the "coordinated production of advanced weapons". Quarles asked that the State Department version be dropped and replaced by the Cutler version, which Defense considered a better expression of its ideas. He said parts of the Defense concept had been left out, and that to be meaningful,

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the proposal should be stated as in the Cutler draft. He said he believed the U.S. would have to jump in and put on the pressure on the other NATO states if we expected to accomplish an integrated production program. He urged that our position be a definite one.

Ambassador Burgess defended the State Department by saying that what was involved was a question of salesmanship. He said he feared we would encounter difficulties if we offered a fixed U.S. plan on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. He preferred to state the Plan in very general and unspecific terms, working out the specifics in the NATO Committee and thereby giving credit to the NATO group rather than seeking to make a firm and detailed offer at the beginning. In addition, he said it was impossible to translate the English word "family", without causing confusion.

Mr. Irwin pointed out four inadequacies in the State draft: (a) the phrase "family of weapons" was dropped entirely; (b) the reference to the NATO spare parts agency as being comparable to the new plan was inaccurate and misleading; (c) there was no reference in the State text to pooling NATO talent, etc; and (d) the security aspects of the program were not adequately covered.

Although there was no decision to do so, the telegram, as revised, returned to the Cutler version of the "family of weapons" plan.

The last paragraph of this message stated that the U.S. was prepared to seek amendments of a specific kind to the existing Atomic Energy statute. Admiral Foster, calling attention to an earlier agreement that the specifics of the proposed amendments to the statute would first be given to Congressional leaders, proposed a substitute which stated that the U.S. would be prepared to present to the Council at a later date the scope of the amendments it would seek. Defense had deleted the paragraph entirely in its redraft of the telegram. State agreed to the AEC revision, but in the final telegram the paragraph was deleted entirely.

Telegram 5 (changed to 6) dealt with force contributions in NATO. Defense suggested a major revision of the State draft seeking to avoid emphasizing that the NATO "shield" was to deter limited aggression. The agreed revision stated that the shield must also be designed to deal with situations short of general war. In addition, a substantial insert was included in the telegram.

General Twining stated that the Defense revisions brought the statement of NATO strategy into line with the existing strategy, which rejects a local war with Russia in the NATO area. He said the U.S. must keep away from the "small war" business.

Secretary Dulles said that an attack by Soviet forces would mean general war, but that probing by East German forces or satellite troops might be a local action. Quarles said that the State draft went in the wrong direction. He admitted that it was possible to have local situations, but he believed we should continue to emphasize that the NATO area is a general war area. We don't want to get on the small war band wagon.



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Irwin read part of the Defense rewrite, which referred to a balanced, mixed nuclear-conventional force. Quarles suggested the compromise language which was accepted.

Quarles also asked that a part of the original concept referring to the pooling of national efforts in NATO in order to avoid unnecessary duplication, be restored to the draft. The Defense wording on this point was accepted.

Telegram 6 (changed to 7) dealt with disarmament. At Quarles' suggestion, the word, "finding" was changed to "seeking", so that the sentence now reads: "The NATO nations should give high priority to seeking a safeguarded disarmament agreement."

Governor Stevenson made some remarks which were inaudible to the participants, other than Secretary Dulles. The Secretary stated, after the conclusion of this interchange, that Governor Stevenson might have further suggestions concerning this telegram. The Secretary said it might not get to Ambassador Burgess as soon as the others. However, it later turned out that the telegram was sent with the others and reflects no additions made by Stevenson.

Telegram 7 (changed to 4) deals with cooperation in scientific research, education and training. Mr. Killian pointed out that the State Department left out the weapons system evaluation mechanism. Reinhardt stated this was in the weapons production telegram. Killian pointed out that in the Task Force recommendations the weapons evaluation system belonged in this section and was not connected with the production part. It was agreed to restore the paragraph dealing with weapons evaluation and weapons systems development planning.

Mr. Killian further suggested a limitation on our offer to make available reports on Government-financed scientific projects. He accepted the words, "a wide range of reports".

Quarles called attention to the fact specific mention of "fair share" was not included in the State draft. He did not suggest a change, since he felt that the State draft implied that our contribution to the NATO scientific effort would be on a fair share basis.

Mr. Killian raised the question of the footnote in the Cutler draft concerning the specific exclusion of nuclear information from the NATO research effort. He stated that he believed nuclear information, insofar as possible, should be included. Mr. Quarles agreed that weapons evaluation studies, for example, would be difficult if it were not possible to include information concerning the effects of nuclear weapons. The consensus appeared to be that the State draft was acceptable because it did not specifically exclude nuclear information and, therefore, would permit the exchange of appropriate nuclear information.

Telegram 8 concerns political consultation in NATO.

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Stevenson stated that the draft was too defensive and too negative. Quarles apparently agreed, and suggested that the negative aspect of the draft would be corrected if the second sentence of the second paragraph were to be deleted. It reads: "We do not think that any country can or should be asked to consult to a degree which would inhibit its ability to act promptly and decisively in case of need."

Secretary Dulles spoke extensively on this point. He said we had to safeguard ourselves so that we would be free to act, if necessary. He said the U.S. could not give a rigid commitment to consult with other NATO members before it took any action. In the months ahead, he added, we may expect to face numerous Soviet probing operations in the Far East, the Middle East, Berlin, etc. These probings must be met instantly if we are to avoid a situation developing to the point where national prestige was involved. If the prestige of either the U.S. or the USSR is involved, then the likelihood of general war is greatly increased. He said the only way to deal with such Soviet probes was to act instantly. There was no time to consult. He explained that in his recent conversations with the German Foreign Minister, he had stated his views, and he believed that Von Bretano had understood and accepted the U.S. position in this matter. He was particularly concerned about becoming committed to consult in the event the Soviets undertook a probe in the area outside NATO. He concluded that unless our reaction to a Soviet move is immediate, the Soviets would get the idea that our will to resist is declining, and if this happened, we would then be over the dam.

At the suggestion of Mr. Berding, the wording in the last sentence was changed to read so that consultation could take place before, or when, problems of common interest arise.

The words, "and especially elsewhere", were added to take account of the fact that on occasions we would wish to consult in the United Nations rather than in the NATO Council.

Telegram 9 deals with economic objectives for NATO. The draft encountered so many objections that it was decided to delay approving it until after it had been written by Under Secretary Dillon and Stevenson in the light of the objections raised at the meeting.

Quarles questioned whether the U.S. should state that NATO countries should place the highest value on economic growth and rising standards of living. He was prepared to say these objectives should have great value, but in view of the fact that NATO countries have so far been quite anxious to put their standard of living above military requirements, he felt that they would continue to do so, but without our prompting.

Mr. Dillon and Mr. Stevenson were both dissatisfied with the draft. Stevenson believed it should go further and state the U.S. intention of providing economic development funds for underdeveloped countries. Dillon believed it should refer to trade barriers, the economic integration of Europe, cooperation of NATO countries in undeveloped areas, and should reaffirm the economic objectives of the UN Charter. Dillon said the uncommitted countries would look carefully at the NATO meeting to see whether the alliance was prepared to assist non-NATO members in their economic development.

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Secretary Dulles said there were two aspects of this question of economic cooperation in NATO. The first was to encourage NATO as a group to engage in cold war activities such as the purchase of Lebanese apples, Icelandic fish and Sudanese cotton. The second was the difficulty of using NATO directly to assist underdeveloped countries, because of NATO's colonial coloration. He believed our support of such organizations as the Colombo Plan, was a preferable way of assisting underdeveloped countries.

Quarles, referring to a Dillon redraft which was later withdrawn, called attention to the fact that we were not liquidating COCOM, and therefore, the lowering of trade barriers would refer to other free states. He added that the Dillon text also needed to make clear that our economic development assistance, as a matter of U.S. policy, was limited to free world countries.

Telegram 10 refers to atoms for peace. Admiral Foster suggested minor revisions, including one which corrected an impression left by the State draft that U.S. policy was to place primary emphasis on CEEC and only assist EURATOM secondarily.

Costing. Quarles indicated that costing of the proposals included in the telegrams was virtually impossible to do. He said that the creation of the NATO Atomic Stockpile would require no weapons in addition to those already in existence. He indicated there would be some U.S. costs involved in custody of the weapons for storage places, as well as U.S. personnel to act as custodians. No estimate was available.

As regards IRBMs, Quarles said we could not estimate the cost until after we knew how many weapons would be deployed.

Secretary McElroy indicated that the cost could amount to \$100 million a squadron. General Twining stated that for planning purposes, the Services were using \$33 million per squadron, but that additional costs, such as base hardening, etc. would vary considerably.

As regards the family of weapons plan, Quarles said the cost would depend on how far the U.S. went with the plan. He said we were already doing much in this general area and would have some additional expenditures in '59. He pointed out that the idea was to get the other NATO members to produce these weapons and pay for them themselves. Defense looks at the plan much as it does the existing Mutual Weapons Development Program.

As regards scientific cooperation, a figure of \$10 million total cost was given. In FY 60 our share might be \$4 million, half that in FY 1959. Quarles referred to a memorandum he had received from French Foreign Minister Pineau referring to the French proposals for scientific cooperation in NATO. Quarles said the French were thinking of an institution comparable to our National Science Foundation, and that their program was considerably more ambitious than the one we were putting forward.

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As to the cost of implementing the economic telegram (9), Burgess saw no additional U.S. costs. He cited the existing funds and the availability of the International Bank.

As regards the peaceful uses telegram, Admiral Foster estimated U.S. programs would involve a very few million dollars in FY 59-60. He indicated that when the OEEC atomic agency comes into being, U.S. costs might rise if we undertook a power program in Europe. He stated that the AEC program was not yet firm, but that one proposal, involving a U.S. subsidy to U.S. manufacturers of atomic plants, might amount to \$10 million annually.

Secretary Dulles concluded the meeting by calling attention to the fact that numerous broad aspects of U.S. foreign policy which would be included in the President's presentation to the Council were not included in the draft telegrams. He referred specifically to Secretary General Spaak's project, which apparently involves a NATO declaration.



Bromley Smith

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